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Abstract 
The famous political philosopher Hannah Arendt develops several arguments why 
truthfulness cannot be counted among the political virtues. This article shows that similar 
arguments apply to lying in business. Based on Hannah Arendt’s theory, we distinguish five 
reasons why lying is a structural temptation in business: business is about action to change 
the world and therefore businessmen need the capacity to deny current reality; commerce 
requires successful image-making and liars have the advantage to come up with plausible 
stories; business communication is more often about opinions than about facts, giving leeway 
to ignore uncomfortable signals; business increasingly makes use of plans and models, but 
these techniques foster inflexibility in acknowledging the real facts; businessmen fall easily 
prey to self-deception, because one needs to act as if the vision already materializes. The 
theory is illustrated by a case study of Landis that grew from a relative insignificant into a 
large organization within a short period of time, but ended with outright lies and bankruptcy. 
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1  Introduction 
 
One of the positive side effects of the credit crisis is that the halting of credit also made it 
more difficult to finance businesses that were built on deceit. The most shocking case 
appeared when  Bernard Madoff  confessed  on 11 December 2008  that he made $50bn 
disappear, obviously the biggest case in the history of lying in business. Many were duped 
and faced bankruptcy, investor lawsuits and shame. One, apparently unable to live with the 
knowledge that he pushed $1.4bn belonging to his social and business acquaintances into 
Madoff, has killed himself.
1
  Mr. Madoff’s case doesn’t stand on its own. There is a history of examples in which 
company officials and managers have made statements which they knew were corresponding 
to no reality at all (Rezaee, 2005). The names of the companies that were built almost entirely 
on fantasy, lie and cheat may still ring a bell with many of us. Some of those businesses were 
seemingly among the biggest and best and their managers were considered respected 
entrepreneurs at the time. What Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, Tyco International and 
HealthSouth have in common is that they once belonged to the premier league of multi-
billion dollar companies that were all listed on a high-profile stock exchange. But also for 
companies that have not experienced  bankruptcy, there are indications of conscious 
manipulation of financial data coined as ‘creative accounting’ (Jameson, 1988; Leung and 
Cooper, 1995).  Even Royal Dutch/Shell, one of the financially conservative enterprises, 
admitted in 2004 that it had overstated its oil reserves by 24% and had to pay fines totaling 
$151 m to US and UK regulators (Grant and Visconte, 2006). 
 
  In literature as well as in public debate, the diagnosis of the lack of trustworthiness of 
corporations has often focused on individual moral deficiencies or institutional deficiencies. 
Some view the combination of personal greed and moral laxity (of, for example, Dennis 
Kolowski at Tyco or Andrew Fastow at Enron or the Tanzis at Parmalat) as a main cause of 
deceit (Dallas, 2004). Others have argued, however, that scandals are not mainly due to 
greed, opportunism, irresponsibility or arrogance among key executives, but point as well to 
the presence of systemic factors. Often mentioned examples of these systemic influences are 
the role  of corporate governance  (Agrawal and Chadha 2005), weakness of accepted 
accounting principles and lack of auditor oversight (Coffee, 2004), inappropriate executive 
compensation systems (Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew, 2006; Efendi, Srivastava and 
Swanson, 2007; Johnson, Ryan and Tian, 2008), badly founded corporate strategies (Grant 
and Visconti, 2006), or the cultural  dominance of monetary success and the resulting 
tendency for social norms to lose their regulatory force (Choo and Tan, 2007). 
In this article we search for philosophical reasons for the  intimate relationship 
between lying and business  beyond the obvious reasons of personal moral laxity  or 
institutional deficiencies. In order to explore this research question, we will be using two 
papers from Hannah Arendt, Lying in Politics (Arendt, 1969) and Truth and Politics (Arendt, 
1968). The advantage of using Arendt for this purpose is that her philosophy is significantly 
grounded in real-life experiences and not the product of theoretical philosophy developed in   
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the absence of context. Her philosophy of lying presupposes an inescapable organizational 
and institutional milieu that may breed personal and institutional failures and is therefore not 
separated but rather closely linked to the institutional analysis referred to above. Both of her 
papers cover the subject of lying in a political context and develop arguments why politicians 
are tempted to lie  in order to realize their political goals. Despite the fact that serious 
differences exist between politics and business, we show that similar arguments apply to the 
business context that explain why businessmen are structurally exposed to the temptation to 
lie.  
The contents of this article are as follows. First, we shortly discuss the definition of 
lying. In the next five sections, we distill five claims of Arendt about lying in politics and 
show how each of them can also explain the structural temptation of lying in business. In 
section 8 we illustrate our findings by a case study of one company that had a vision of 
becoming a large international company but ended with outright lies and bankruptcy. Section 
9 summarizes the main findings and contributions of the paper. 
 
2  Lying, deceit and deceitfulness 
 
According to Sissela Bok a lie can be defined as follows: ‘A lie is a statement, believed by 
the liar to be false, made to another person with the intention that the person be deceived by 
the statement’ (Bok, 1989: 13). Another definition that demonstrates a great deal of overlap is 
from Bernard Williams. He takes a lie to be ‘an assertion, the content of which the speaker 
believes to be false, which is made with the intention to deceive the hearer with regard to that 
content’ (Williams, 2002: 96).  
These definitions can be broken down in several component parts (Mahon, 2008). In 
order to establish a lie: 1) it is required that a person makes a statement and, 2) that the person 
making the statement believes that statement to be false and, 3) that the believed false 
statement is made to another person and, 4) that it is the intention of the person making the 
statement that it is judged to be true by the other person.
2 Each of these requirements allow 
for further specific interpretations. For example, whereas the first requirement stresses that 
lying assumes that the liar makes a statement, also signs and expressions that are common in 
a particular context can count as a statement.  Even silence can be used as a means  of 
communication  with the intention to deceive, because silence often carries a particular 
meaning. The second requirement implies that a statement that was incorrectly believed by 
the liar to be false but is in fact true still can be qualified as a lie. Because the condition that a 
statement is believed to be false is fulfilled even in the case that the liar was erroneously 
believing that the statement was wrong. On the other hand, communicating falsehoods or 
inaccuracies, not knowing that one does,  should not be referred to as lying.  The  third 
requirement obviously does not exclude generic statements that were conceived for a wider 
audience, or electronic mails or advertisement, which can also potentially qualify as lying. 
Finally, and most importantly, in order to lie there must be the intention to deceive the   
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addressee. This means that it is not necessary that the intention to deceive is successful. 
Lying is not a success verb, it is the intention that is decisive.  
  This also explains why lying is very hard to detect and why liars can often get away 
with lying so easily. Intent must be formed before the act, and it must unite with the act: 
‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’, which means that the act does not make a person 
guilty unless the mind is guilty too. Thus, in order to demonstrate that somebody is lying, we 
have to be able to establish that the liar has the intention to deceive the addressee about the 
content of the statement made, as well as the intention to deceive the addressee about the 
liar’s beliefs and the intention to deceive the addressee about the sincerity of the liar. Since an 
intention is a mental state, it can however not objectively be explored.
3
According to Rappaport (2008), a lie is often associated with deceit, but deceit is 
more general both in occurrence and in scope. The term ‘deceit’ implies an intention to 
mislead to the disadvantage of those who are misled, particularly vis-à-vis those misleading 
them. ‘Lie’ also entails intention, but the defining intention of the lie is related to the signal 
transmitted, whereas the defining intention of deceit is concerned with the effect upon, or 
more specifically, the response of, the receiver (Rappaport, 2008: 11). From this insight we 
can conclude that deceit can be achieved through lying and that most lies cause deceit, but 
that this is not necessarily and in every instance the case. If, for instance, telling the truth 
aggravates a particular situation as in certain medical situations, it can be ethically defended 
not to tell the truth and to consequently lie about a particular situation. This so called white 
lie is a lie according to Sissela Bok’s definition, but it is not deceitful as the intention to 
mislead is not to the disadvantage of the misled (Bok, 1989: 58).  
 Rather, the intention 
has to be reconstructed from identifiable signs and behavior. In such a reduction there is 
always a chance that something is misinterpreted, overlooked or even missed. When a 
contextually relevant intention corresponds with an act that falls within the definition of lying 
and, when on top of that, a reasonable and direct enough link can be established between the 
act and the intention (mens rea and actus reus), then a court may be able to determine that 
there is sufficient proof that somebody is lying. But, even then, before lying becomes relevant 
from a point of view of criminal law, it is furthermore necessary that the person lying can be 
said to have understood and wanted the offence committed. This makes it a daunting 
challenge to sufficiently prove that somebody was lying, even if it appears to be obvious to 
an outsider. 
Furthermore, important for our purpose is the notion that intention to deceive may not 
be enough to establish deceitfulness. There are situations in which we explicitly or tacitly 
accept to be deceived. In games and in play we expect and accept to be lead down a ‘wrong’ 
track by an intentionally misleading opponent. This is obviously not deceitful. What deceit 
presupposes is the existence of a relationship of trust which deceit then violates whereas no 
relationship of trustfulness prevailed at the time of the act (Rappaport, 2008). Hence, the 
quintessential element is the abuse of this relationship of trust between individuals or groups. 
It is particularly in those cases that lies become unethical and damaging to society at large.
4
 




3  Action and mental freedom 
 
Hannah Arendt’s essay ‘Lying in politics’ is a response to the Pentagon Papers about 
America’s role in Vietnam. The basic issue that these papers raise is deception. According to 
Hannah Arendt truthfulness has never been counted among the political virtues, and lies have 
always been regarded as justifiable tools in political dealing (Ahrendt, 1968: 223; 1969: 4). In 
this and the next four sections we want to bring forward several arguments substantiating 
why Hannah Arendt thinks that truth is not a  virtue  in politics  and show why Arendt’s 
analysis of the reasons for lying in politics is also relevant for business.  
  A first argument why according to Arendt truthfulness has never been counted among 
the political virtues follows from the notion that politics is all about action. This is expressed 
by the following citations: 
 
“A characteristic of human action is that it always begins something new, and this does 
not mean that it is ever permitted to start ab ovo, to create ex nihilo. In order to make 
room for one’s own action, something that was there before must be removed or 
destroyed, and things as they were before are changed. Such change would be 
impossible if we could not mentally remove ourselves from where we physically are 
located and imagine that things might as well be different from what they actually are. 
In other words, the deliberate denial of factual truth –  the ability to lie  –  and the 
capacity to change facts –  the ability to act –  are interconnected; they owe their 
existence to the same source: imagination.” (Arendt, 1969: 5) 
 
“He (the Liar) is an actor by nature; he says what is not so because he wants things to 
be different from what they are – that is, he wants to change the world.” (Arendt, 1968: 
246) 
 
No matter what the reasons may be, politicians have a desire to change the world. We cannot 
create something new out of nothing and therefore we have to procure the space we need to 
make manifest our ideas. Politics derives from a vision that the world can be different from 
what it is now. Having a vision is something that enables political leaders to guide people 
into unchartered territory. To be able to remove oneself from today’s reality, not accepting 
the world as it is, requires imagination. This means that in order to realize our dreams 
something else has to give way. Without the mental freedom to deny or affirm existence, no 
action would be possible. Deliberate falsehoods are also attempts to remove oneself from 
today’s reality. The deliberate denial of truth – the ability to lie – and the capacity to act are 
thus interconnected. Also the liar is a man of action who wants to change the world and in 
order to achieve that, he says what is not so.




Action is not only the very stuff politics are made of, but also of business. There is no doubt 
that businessmen and politicians share the affinity with action. Just as politicians, 
businessmen have a capacity to see a future state of things which don’t exist (yet). Businesses 
are based on ideas that were once rooted in people’s heads who made them manifest by 
coming into action. Just like politicians, businessmen thus have a desire to change the world. 
Yesterday’s ideas lie at the core of today’s business world because some people decided not 
to stick with the world as it was. They took action and went off to create what they could see 
for themselves. This is what innovation is all about. A new product or solution is imagination 
coming into action. 
 
4  Successful image making 
 
“Since the liar is free to fashion his “facts” to fit the profit and pleasure, ore even the 
mere expectations, of his audience, the chances are that he will be more persuasive than 
the truth teller. Indeed, he will usually have plausibility on his side; his exposition will 
sound more logical, as it were, since the element of unexpectedness –  one of the 
outstanding characteristics of all events – has mercifully disappeared. ” (Arendt, 1968: 
247) 
 
“It is equally  true in image-making of all sorts, in which again, every known and 
established fact can be denied or neglected if it is likely to hurt the image; for an image, 
unlike an old-fashioned portrait, is supposed not to flatter reality but to offer a full-
fledged substitute for it. And this substitute, because of modern techniques and the mass 
media, is, of course, much more in the public eye than the original ever was.” (Arendt, 
1968: 248) 
 
In order to be successful, the politicians must convince the audience of  their vision.
6
  Hence, truthfulness is not so much a political virtue because it makes it harder to 
convince the audience and therefore to prepare the way to change. Only if the policy of 
image-making does not succeed, the politician may fall back to another strategy to gain 
 
According to Arendt, half of politics is image-making and the other half the art of making 
peoples believe in the imagery (Arendt, 1969: 8). They view their audience from a public-
relations perspective. In order to convince the public, it is important to create an image that is 
coherent and consistent. Here, the liar is at an advantage as he can fashion the facts to tailor 
them to suit the ‘reality’ that he sees before his eyes. He will sound more plausible and 
logical as the element of unexpectedness has disappeared.  Not bothered by having to 
communicate unwelcome facts, the liar has the ability to sweet talk to every audience while 
adjusting his pitch to what people want to hear. He has prepared his story for public 
consumption to making it credible.    
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support, that is by using carrot and stick. As substitutes for more violent means, lies can 
therefore be considered as relatively harmless tools in the arsenal of political action. 
 
Also with respect to image-making, there is a striking parallel between politics and business. 
In the modern business environment huge amounts of money are invested in image-making. 
Madoff could do what he has done because he managed to create an image of reliability and 
trustworthiness. It was done with extreme care. How a company appears in the public eye is 
of the greatest importance. More than ever, companies represent how we should live and to 
which group we belong. Something as simple as a soft drink has become an icon personifying 
a particular lifestyle. Those images are carefully crafted and unwelcome facts that have the 
potential to distort this manufactured image are met with hostility. Substantial marketing and 
advertising budgets are deployed to maintain an image intact because there is a lot at stake.
7
In this process,  dangers because  of the manipulation of facts  constantly  arise. 
Schoderbek and Deshpande (1996) estimate that impression management (measured by the 
so-called impression management scale) is significantly correlated to unethical conduct 
(measured by the Ruch and Newstrom ethics scale) as well as to over claiming (measured by 
the so-called over claiming scale). An illustrative example is the image that Philip Morris Inc 
wanted to portray through its brand Marlboro (Colby, 2008). The cowboy riding his horse 
was an image of freedom and the good life. Despite the fact that for a long time they have 
stopped using that image, it still is with us. A reality that has a counter side to it, though. 
Instead of selling a perceived happy lifestyle, Philip Morris sells cigarettes that were known 
to cause deadly diseases. Seen from this perspective, the ‘good’ life as presented by Marlboro 
is anything but the good life, but exactly the opposite. What is interesting is that despite the 
fact that both Philip Morris and their customers are aware of the negative effects of smoking, 
these facts remain underexposed as they are hostile to the image. 
 
People often buy a dream rather than a product (Waide, 2007).  
Also communication on corporate social responsibility  is part of the company’s 
impression management (Hooghiemstra, 2000). Companies engage in corporate social 
reporting to affect public’s perceptions of the company, using it as an instrument for 
controlling public relations (Owen et al, 2000). As management is willing to report good 
news, but reluctant to disclose bad news, social and environmental disclosures run the risk to 
be to a large extent self-laudatory (Hooghiemstra, 2000). In a study of Australian companies 
which were known to have breached various environmental protection laws, Deegan and 
Rankin (1996) show, for example,  that the disclosure of positive information greatly 
outweigh the negative disclosure. The mean amount of negative disclosures was only 5.5 
words.  Only 10% of the companies made a reference to the breach of environmental law. 
Interestingly, the sample of prosecuted firms significantly disclosed more (positive) 
environmental information than firms that were not prosecuted. Firms apparently tried to 
deflect attention from the proven misconduct towards their positive environmental policies. 
Also Wiseman (1982) finds for US companies in the steel, oil and pulp sectors that there 
appears to be no relationship between the environmental performance disclosed in  annual   
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reports and their actual environmental performance. Berthelot et al (2003) refer to various 
other researches that show that voluntary environmental disclosure is not a reliable indicator 
of a firm’s environmental performance. According to Gray (2001) social reports are 
incomplete to such an extent that one must conclude that they are either a waste of time and 
money or even a deliberate attempt to mislead society as to the quality of CSR of the 
reporting companies. He concludes that voluntary reporting practices will not advance 
accountability, because providing complete information is not in the organization’s interest. 
Hess and Dunfee (2007) argue that if it is not possible to know whether a company is telling 
the truth or just engages in cheap talk, stakeholders will turn away from this information, 
resulting in what they call a ‘babbling equilibrium’. In this situation, a firm can adopt the 
appearance of a CSR program, without actually taking care to prevent wrongdoing. They 
attempt to change perceptions without changing facts (Hess, 2007). 
 
5  Truth and opinion 
 
“The trouble is that factual truth, like all other truth, peremptorily claims to be 
acknowledged and precludes debate, and debate constitutes the very essence of political 
life.” (Arendt, 1969: 237) 
  
“Factual truth is no more self-evident than opinion, and this may be among the reasons 
that opinion holders find it relatively easy to discredit factual truth as just another 
opinion.” (Arendt, 1969: 239) 
 
A third reason for the conflict between politics and truth is that politics is about debate. 
Unwelcome factual truths are therefore often transformed into opinions that can be debated. 
Factual truth differs from opinion in the degree of claimed validity. Because facts are beyond 
dispute, they carry an element of coercion that opinions lack. From a political point of view, 
truth may therefore seen as despotic. Unwelcome opinions can be rejected or compromised 
upon, but unwelcome facts possess a stubbornness that can only be removed by outright lies. 
Of course, facts and opinions belong to the same realm, as facts inform opinions. Opinions 
that differ widely may still be legitimate, but only as long as they respect factual truth. Hence, 
although politicians have a right to interpret the facts in accordance to their own vision, they 
are not allowed to change the facts themselves. 
  The reason why politicians may find it relatively easy to discredit factual truth as just 
another opinion is that contingent facts are not compellingly true.
8 They could always have 
been otherwise. Facts need testimony to be remembered and trustworthy witnesses. But 
eyewitnesses are notoriously unreliable and facts recorded by documents can be suspected as 
forgeries. There are many known examples in history in which facts have been deliberately 
misrepresented or lied away. Facts that are ignored or deliberately lied away or that are 
otherwise transitioned out of the world may disappear forever, because their content often 
defies verification. The chances that an element of factual truth survives the deliberate attack   
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from powers that want to make such facts disappear are not seriously high. Because of this 
contingent character, factual truth is always very vulnerable. 
 
Also in business unwelcome facts can be easily ignored because business communication is 
often about opinions. In the stock market, a business is valued by its future potential of 
making profits, which depends on market expectations. Companies therefore have a major 
interest in communicating positive expectations in annual reports on the realization of 
business plans. This kind of statements does, however, not have the status of factual truth. To 
verify whether a fact is true, we have to check its occurrence and this can only be done with 
respect to the past. But such markers are absent when talking about the future. Any statement 
about a future event therefore reflects an opinion that only grows gradually into falsity or 
truth because of the elapse of time. This gives leeway for ignoring signals that contrast the 
expectations. 
  Grant and Visconti (2006) show for 12 case studies of US and European companies 
involved in major accounting scandals that the background of the accounting fraud is a 
strategic misfit based on overambitious growth targets, multiple acquisitions and excessive 
debt financing. For businessmen who are in charge of realizing a future goal, admitting 
failure when things go wrong is indeed never easy. The alternative – to change the image of 
the future and admit failure – may be too difficult and too costly. It is easier to continue along 
the same track ignoring the signals.  As long as there is time, there is the thought of a 
possibility to catch up and use the elapse of time in combination with targeted action to cover 
up.  However, once allowing deviations between the reality actually perceived and the 
communicated ‘facts’, there is hardly an avenue that leads back to reality. The problem is that 
lies often start small and then grow bigger. The incentives to lie the second time will be 
greater once one has started lying, because lying seldom cures the underlying reasons that 
caused the failures. When the problem that prompted the first lie reappears, the risk of having 
past untruths exposed is a powerful incentive to lie again (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2008). 
  Obviously, it very difficult to say when lying starts if businesses communicate 
unrealistic opinions about the expected performance in future. If predictions do not 
materialize, is it because they have been deceptively communicated like that, or is failure the 
result of unforeseen circumstances? Hence it is hard, if not impossible, to judge the extent to 
which people are lying when they make statements about the future. Without doubt some 
statements are likelier than others, but there are no clear indicators telling us when we have 
entered the world of error or fantasy or deliberate falsehood. A goal may seem impossible 
from the start, but only the elapse of time will tell the real tale. How big must the deviation 
from an original prediction be before we can consider it a moral duty to inform stakeholders? 
Is it 5 percent or 10 or 50? There are no clear answers and this provides opportunities for 
companies to communicate predictions that they know themselves to be unrealistic. 
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6  The use of models 
 
“They were eager to discover laws by which to explain and predict political historical 
facts as though they were necessary, and thus as reliable , as the physicists once 
believed natural phenomena to be.” (Arendt, 1968: 11) 
 
 “Insofar as they have the appetite for action and are also in love with theories…, they 
will be tempted to fit their reality … into their theory, thereby mentally getting rid of its 
disconcerting contingency.” (Arendt, 1968: 12) 
 
The fourth argument that we derive from Hannah Arendt’s analysis does not pertain to the 
politicians in the first place, but rather to those who inform politicians with political analysis. 
Arendt refers to this group as the higher ranks of the civilian services. According to Arendt, 
these people can be characterized as problem-solvers with great self confidence who rarely 
doubt their ability to prevail and are accustomed to winning. They are different from the 
ordinary image makers, in the sense that they are intelligent and in love with abstract theory 
and models.  
But the use of sophisticated modeling techniques in the preparation of policy runs the 
danger that politicians put an unrealistic faith in models and theory. Although models help us 
understand complex aspects of reality, they may also foster blindness for aspects that are not 
in the model (Brümmer, 1993). Politicians tend to forget that any model that their advisors 
are using is a representation of reality, and never more than that. At the same time, insofar as 
politicians have the appetite for action, their advisors will hardly have the time to wait until 
the theories and hypothetical explanations are verified or denied by facts. Instead they will be 
tempted to adjust facts to make them fit their theory.  
Because of too much confidence in ‘theory’ and ‘models’ of their advisors, the risk 
increases that politicians lose connection with reality and that they enter into a defactualized 
world. In the words of Hannah Arendt (1969: 20): ‘the bureaucratic model had completely 
displaced reality: the hard and stubborn facts, which so many intelligence analysts were paid 
so much to collect, were ignored’.  
 
Like in politics, also in the business world there is an increasing pervasiveness of the use of 
theories and methodologies. In 2004, 78 of the top 100 universities in the US offered courses 
on business planning, typically in the area of entrepreneurship or small business management 
(Honig, 2004). It is obviously important for business leaders to use methods for planning 
purposes. Usually a planning department is responsible for putting together multi-year 
business plans. Those plans are used by management to pro-actively align resources in order 
to realize envisaged targets. Guiding an organization into a particular direction becomes 
much easier if management has a sense of direction. However, the research on how business 
plans affect profitability has yielded mixed results. Some of these studies found a positive 
relationship between planning and profitability, growth and performance. For example, in an   
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empirical research on 223 new ventures in Sweden, Delmar and Share (2003) find that 
business planning is an important precursor to action in new ventures. By helping firm 
founders to make decisions, to balance resource supply and demand, and to turn abstract 
goals into concrete operational steps, business planning reduces the likelihood of venture 
disbanding and accelerates product development and venture organizing activity. But other 
studies found a negative, or lack of relationship, between business plans and profitability 
(Honig, 2004). 
  One of the reasons for the negative impact of business plans on performance is that 
planning is constraining creative responses to environmental changes (Mintzberg, 1987). 
Regularly business plans receive a certain degree of authority that gets elevated to a level 
similar to a ‘truth’. The fascination with such imaginary goals is surprising and typically suit 
problem-solvers and business-planners who are trained in translating factual content into a 
language of numbers and scenario’s. However, no matter the level of theory that is applied, 
every plan suffers from the same defect, they remain what they are: plans. To a smaller or 
larger degree no complex business plan ever gets fully realized, but the desire to perform 
according to plan remains a strong motivator. Predictability, although counter natural, is 
something that is highly praised by business executives and rewarded by shareholders (Blake 
et al, 2000). No doubt it is vital to have plans and ideas about where we want to go, but we 
should not lose sight of the fact that there is nothing permanent about such plans. No matter 
how hard we try, as long as plans have not reached the status of fact, they remain an 
intelligent guess about what the future might look like.
9
  Again, there is an evident link with lying. Although the motive is different, just like 
image making, business planning may lead to a more or less conscious neglect of stubborn 
facts, just because they do no fit the assumptions on which the business plan is based. If a 
manager  has  puts his entire weight behind a plan,  and the assumptions turn out to be 
incorrect, an easy way to safe face for those who have developed the plan is to ignore these 
signals and to change ‘reality’. 
  
 
7  Self-deception 
 
“The more successful a liar is, the more people he has convinced, the more likely it is 
that he will end by believing his own lies.” (Arendt, 1968: 34) 
 
“Only self-deception is likely to create a semblance of truthfulness, and in a debate 
about the facts the only persuasive factor that sometimes has a chance to prevail 
against pleasure, fear and profit is personal appearance.” (Arendt, 1969: 250) 
 
The fifth reason why truthfulness is not a political virtue we take from Hannah Arendt’s 
analysis of the question how politicians can lie at such a grand scale. This explanation points 
at the interconnectedness of deception and self deception. As discussed above, to change 
reality as it is, requires imagination. A common theme in success psychology is that to get to   
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the desired success, one has to be able to put oneself in the situation as if the goal had already 
been achieved. The danger associated with this kind of image-making and the consequent 
mass manipulation to make the audience believe the image is that it may easily evolve to self-
deception. If others start seriously believing the truth of the image, the politician may also 
become more and more convinced of his vision. Successful politicians are thus susceptible to 
falling prey to self-deception.  
This self-deception helps the liar to be much more trustworthy in the eyes of others. 




  Because once one is convinced of certain facts, it is much easier to 
convince others of these facts. One is then acting from within the same boat as the victims 
and not from a cold distant place. Self-deception is often met with more permissiveness and 
tolerance than cold lying. 
The importance of mental freedom,  successful image making, opinions and the use of 
business plans in business makes businessmen also susceptible to self deception. In order to 
arrive at the different world that a businessman can see because of his visionary mind, he 
often lives and acts as if this new world already exists, deliberately deceiving his own mind 
as a consequence. The step from image-making to believing is a small one, and if the people 
who are creating those images are not careful, the image becomes a perceived reality in the 
minds of themselves.  
  Such self-deception is instrumental to what Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004) coin 
“ethical fading”, a process by which the moral colors of an ethical decision fade into bleached 
hues that are void of moral implications. Because self-deception allows the businessman to 
behave self-interestedly, while at the same time believing that he upholds his moral 
principles. This process is facilitated by various enables, such as language euphemisms and 
routinization of decisions. For example, instead of illegal accounting practices managers talk 
about aggressive accounting. These terms may become so commonplace that managers do no 
longer see the questionable behavior that they represent. That also applies to decision making 
processes that become routine and therefore ordinary. A series of small steps away from 
ethical and acceptable practices, if sufficiently small, may therefore lead to an unconscious 
practice of lying.  
  Another mechanism that evokes self deception suggested by the analysis of Arendt is 
that it is in the business interest to inform top executives selectively. A example is provided 
by the construction fraud in the Netherlands (XXX). In 2001 a TV program by Zembla 
exposed a clearing system for construction companies that colluded in price offers for public 
works. In 1992, the European Commission prohibited the practice of pre-consulting and in 
1998 the Dutch government implemented this EU regulation and forbade the practice of ex-
ante consultations. But, as the TV program showed, the practice still continued  in 2001. 
When the fraud unfolded, many construction companies were persecuted and fined. In 
response, many CEO’s of large Dutch construction companies complained that they had not 
known these practices. The reason might well be that the executives in charge of acquisition   
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policy deliberately did not inform their bosses, because it was neither in their own interest nor 
in the interest of the business doing so. Because a company is more successful in presenting 
an honest image if the CEO believes his company to be fully honest. 
 
8  Landis, a case study in lying  
 
As a case study we have chosen Landis. The Landis case is particular not because of its 
relative size. Though sizable in terms of absolute numbers there are more important 
bankruptcies that can be studied. What interests us in the Landis case is that it has several 
characteristics that makes trust in its future plans a crucial factor of success. Though Landis 
Group N.V. has been in existence since 1991, the listing on the Amsterdam Euronext 
exchange in 1998 marks a departure from Landis as a pure trading company. From 1998 
onwards Landis is increasingly entering new business areas with which the management has 
had very little experience. As there was very limited history of the firm’s performance in 
these new areas, the outside observer had few anchors to judge the extent to which 
information coming from the company is realistic or not. This provided the company 
management with a context in which they could operate relatively freely and created a setting 
in which the mechanisms that Arendt’s theory of lying stress could easily show up. 
   
Historical overview of Landis  
Landis grew out of HCS Technology N.V. when it was made independent in 1991 as a result 
of a successful management buy-out. Its original focus was that of a supplier of information 
technology and more specifically of communication equipment. In order to reap the benefits 
of a growing market it reinvented itself from a local reseller into an international full-service 
distributor. The growth was made possible because of acquisitions that were facilitated by an 
IPO (initial public offering) that took place in 1998. Having floated the company on a stock 
exchange facilitated the access to capital which allowed Landis to take its expansion ideas 
even further. But in order to sustain expansion in a competitive market, Landis needed 
additional capital to support its growth. For that purpose it raised a loan of 175 million euro 
from a syndicate of nine banks. This transaction was completed during the third quarter of 
2000. In March 2001 it raised another 45 million euro by means of a convertible loan which 
had to be renegotiated because of liquidity issues. A breach of trust with the banks combined 
with a shortage of cash as a result of negative cash flows on the side of Landis called for 
different solutions. When the banks cancelled the loan and Landis reported a loss of 52 
million euro for the year 2001 on April 11 2002 the Board of Directors stepped down. The 
liquidation of Landis became unavoidable when a rescue plan presented by an entirely new 
Board of Directors was turned down on April 22 of the same year. Landis went bankrupt on 
July 8 2002. As a consequence 3000 employees lost their jobs and roughly 600 million euro 
could be considered lost during the process which lasted not much longer than 4 years. 
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Figure 1  Landis share price 
 
 
Source: Euronext  
   
What went wrong? 
One of the facts that contributed to the course of events as they took place is the way Landis 
financed its expansion. First, during and after the flotation of the Landis business it acquired 
around 440 million euro in cash mainly by issuing shares. Second, while listed, Landis 
acquired a large number of businesses by issuing stock. In order to sustain its growth it had to 
report positive results if the Landis management were to continue an expansion strategy of 
any kind. Management realized that a substantial decline in the Landis stock price would be 
an obstacle to growing the company by means of using its shares to acquire additional 
businesses. A declining share price was something that had to be avoided at all cost. As the 
financial position of Landis was extremely fragile, at least in retrospect, a difficult dance had 
to be performed in order to maintain a positive image. 
  This task was made even more difficult as market conditions started to change again. 
The year 2000 marked a turning point. In the IT sector spending was at an all time high and 
general consent had it that growth would continue. But it didn’t. The NASDAQ stock 
exchange reached its all-time high on March 10th, 2000 at a level of 5132.52. Shortly after, 
the heavily technology dependent exchange would fall more than 62% in the following two 
years when the bottom dropped out of the so-called Internet bubble. Landis being in the 
center of the technology industry suffered as a result of the deteriorating market conditions.  
As if the implosion of the technology industry was not enough, another important 
element negatively impacted Landis’ chances to sustain its growth. Presumably driven by the 
almost unlimited possibilities of new technology, an initiative was launched at the end of the 
last century to offer more extensive mobile services. Licenses allowing telecom operators to 
utilize this so-called third-generation mobile services (UMTS or "3G") were auctioned at 
record amounts. But their roll-out - initially expected in 2002 – has been taking place more 
slowly than originally planned, and the great expectations associated with their introduction 
contrast starkly with the difficulties facing the sector. It was only in 2004, for instance, that 
KPN started offering UMTS services.    
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Could it be considered just a stroke of bad luck only that Landis had focused its entire 
business on two sectors of the technology market that were effectively shrinking, or has 
management been over-optimistic about market opportunities? Fact is that management had 
taken a bet and was late in acting when things turned against expectations.  
A final explanation of what went wrong is the way in which Landis acquired target 
companies. Because of the growth-strategy management believed they had to adopt, Landis 




 it can be deducted that an amount in excess of 417 million euro has been 
charged to Landis’ equity in the years between 1999 and 2001 because of takeovers. Without 
doubt the number of entities that had to be integrated was higher than 10. As a rule, the 
preparation before taking over the many companies as they did was insufficient. In most 
cases the obvious minimum requirements that one has to satisfy before paying sizeable 
amounts for an acquisition target were not met. There are hardly any records indicating that 
proper market research had been done for any of the companies that were acquired. Financial 
due diligence was mostly limited to a quick scan. Maybe Landis management was not 
concerned about the acquisition at all, since most of it was paid in Landis shares. Like no one 
else they had inside knowledge about the intrinsic value of their own shares. Maybe it is an 
indicator for the fact that the management could not be called naïve. 
Landis as an illustration of the relevance of Arendt’s theory 
From the case study about Landis parallels can be drawn between the theory that we have 
derived from studying Hannah Arendt and the way lying played a role in the demise of 
Landis.  
First, when we look at action and mental freedom it is clear that Landis was the 
brainchild of a group of entrepreneurs who could imagine a future. Looking at growing 
markets, the management team tried to envisage what they had to do to address those 
business opportunities. As a consequence they began to transform Landis into the company 
that in their eyes was required to achieve their objectives. The strategic objective was, as the 
Landis 2000 annual report points out,  ‘to become the leading value added networking 
distributor throughout Europe.’  The flotation on the Amsterdam stock exchange was 
necessary to facilitate the planned growth. The mental capacity to imagine a future that others 
do not see, is also reflected by a response of Mr. Paul Kuiken in an interview by Computable 
on 6 September 2000, after Landis lost a distribution contract with an important supplier 
(Cisco Systems). Despite the fact market conditions were visibly deteriorating, in this 
interview Mr. Kuiken was confident that Landis could double its revenues in the second half 
of the year 2000 while increasing profits by 50%. 
  The second element we look at is image-making. Appearing to be consistently 
successful is an important element when you want to make a company grow. To the outside 
world they created an image of a successfully managed and fast growing small private 
company that managed to transform itself into an international market leader company and 
that was led by people who were in control of their destiny. In order to gain and maintain   
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credibility in the eyes of shareholders, investors and competitors, Landis had to be able to 
realize their plans. Unwelcome facts that could harm the image were therefore carefully lied 
away. This can be illustrated by a number of serious and demonstrable misrepresentations, 
such as:  
1)  An e-mail has been found that was submitted by Mrs. Bonnema, the Landis 
controller, in which she instructs a subordinate from the consolidation department to do 
exactly this: ‘redo all calculations but ensure that the totals do match, adjust the rest. Come 
what may I must arrive at euro 0.26 a share and an EBIT of 45 million Dutch guilders’.  
2) The profits that were recorded for 1999 were off by at least 7.4 million euro. 
Instead of the reported 9.9 million the more accurate number should have been 2.5 million. 
3) The loan referred to earlier was granted under the condition that Landis informed 
the bank syndicate about its financial situation. In reality, Landis had issued compliance 
certificates that were incorrectly stating that Landis complied with the ratios agreed with 
banks. In actual fact, Landis had never complied with any of the ratios.
12
4) Landis raised most of euro 440 million on the capital market in the years 1998 to 
2001. It can be concluded that Landis raised most of its capital based on misleading and too 
positive figures, because the guarantee capital as at the end of 2000 was not euro 111.6 
million, as presented by Landis in its annual accounts for 2000, but at the most euro 53.4 
million and therefore less than half the presented amount. Landis' solvency as at the end of 
2000, expressed as the guarantee capital in proportion to the balance sheet total, was therefore 
not the presented 28.2% but at the most 15.9%.
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5) Most acquisitions have been wrongly recorded. Goodwill has in several cases been 
used (4U Group and Dennis Bergström) to make the results look prettier as in fact they were. 
 
Thirdly,  like any company  with a growth strategy, Landis was keen on 
communicating future expectations that would allow attracting the financial means to finance 
the growth of the company. Significant in this respect is that Landis still announced publicly, 
on 31 October 2001, that it expected a profit for 2001 of at least EUR 0.40 a share, which 
would work out to a profit of EUR 19 million. It is also significant that the second internal 
annual balance for 2001, dated around February 2002, did indeed show a profit of over EUR 
19 million. More than a month later, Landis announced a loss of EUR 52 million for 2001. 
(Seventeenth report etc. 2007: 31). It is difficult to ascertain from the outside whether a 
company’s board believed itself in its communicated (unrealistic) expectations or whether the 
predictions were deliberate deceptive. Nevertheless, in the case of Landis the evidence of 
deliberate manipulation of data presented above indicates that Landis maximally used the 
leeway that opinions about the future offer in order to wait for a (increasingly implausible) 
turn in the market that would make these expectations come true. This behaviour comes with 
the risk of ethical fading. If one can get away with small transgressions (a euphemism for the 
word lies), chances are that the next lie is going to be a bigger one: ‘one lie perpetuates many 
more’. 
The fourth element has to do with too much confidence in theory and planning. The 
growth strategy that Landis had developed was based on such a plan; a model of the real   
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world in which Landis was operating. In the 1999 annual report Landis states that it wanted 
to become a leading supplier in the internet and telecoms domain. To pursue such a strategy 
several events needed to subsequently happen in order to be able to compete. If then 
important assumptions like the uptake and wide availability of 3G UMTS networks prove 
themselves wrong, management has to act. When the market conditions started to work 
against Landis, the entire strategy should have changed as a result. None of that happened.  
To illustrate, as late as in 2000 Landis completed a sizable acquisition of a network services 
company (Detron) paying 255 million for the goodwill of the company alone. 
Only the last element of Arendt’s theory does not seem particularly relevant in the 
case of Landis, as Landis’ manipulation of data described above indicates that the misleading 
communication by Landis did not result from self deception and an unconscious adaption of 
facts to the own vision. Neither do we have indications that there was a kind of role division 
in the sense that the top of Landis was deliberately badly informed by the lower management 
levels in order to make Landis’ communication to its stakeholders more convincing. An 
indication is that the deliberate manipulation of financial data was ordered by the higher 
levels of management. As a rule, forecasts were discarded by the CEO Mr. Paul Kuiken, who 
insisted that divisional management had to work differently to obtain higher revenues and 




Roland  Berger Strategy Consultants, a consulting firm that has studied many 
bankruptcies including that of Landis, nicely  summarizes the various elements that we 
discussed above when it states: ‘Companies that end up in a crisis in the manner of Landis are 
often neither able nor willing to take appropriate measures with the necessary openness and 
determination. Instead, the management confines itself to denying the facts or it applies a 
considerable amount of energy to preventing the crisis from becoming known. By means of 
reporting measures, the balance sheet can for the time being still be ‘brightened up’. The fact 
that a crisis exists is only acknowledged when the results dramatically come to light, liquidity 
problems and the shareholders’ equity has been almost entirely used up. At that point, there is 
hardly any room left for taking appropriate measures and the company is consequently no 
longer able to come out of the crisis on its own’.




9   Conclusion 
 
Literature has developed several explanations for lying in business beyond the obvious and 
straightforward explanation of personal gain, such as  the role of corporate governance, 
weakness of accepted accounting principles, inappropriate executive compensation systems, 
badly founded corporate strategies or the cultural dominance of monetary success and the 
resulting tendency for social norms to lose their regulatory force. This article searches for 
more  fundamental philosophical reasons that may explain why  lying and business  are 
intimately related. For this purpose, we use Hannah Arendt analysis of lying in politics. The 
advantage of using Arendt for this purpose is that she is well aware of the significance of   
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organizational and institutional milieu on communication. Therefore her philosophy is 
closely linked to the type of institutional analysis that is common in business ethics literature.  
  Based on two essays of Arendt on lying, we distill five reasons for lying in politics 
that also apply to business: politics and business is about action to change the world and 
therefore politicians as well as businessmen need the capacity to deny current reality; politics 
and business requires successful image-making and liars have the advantage to come up with 
plausible stories; political and business communication is more often about opinions than 
about facts, giving leeway to ignore uncomfortable signals; political and business decision 
processes increasingly make use of plans and models, but these techniques foster inflexibility 
in acknowledging the real facts;  politicians  and businessmen fall easily prey to self-
deception, because one need to act as if the vision already materializes.  
  Our application of Arendt’s philosophy of lying to business adds several additional 
insights to existing business literature. First, by showing the relevance of her analysis of lying 
in politics for business, we have been able to make clear that lying is not specific to business 
and its focus on money making alone. It makes clear that lapses in business ethics are not 
primarily the result of businessmen choosing profit over what is right. Since similar 
mechanisms are at  work in the context of politics, lying must  result from more general 
characteristics of human psychology and behavior that are stimulated and developed both in 
the context of the policy making process and the practice of business. This indicates that the 
reasons for lying are not personal, but rather systemic in nature. That means that such 
unethical behavior are not characteristic of a special group of unethical people, the bad 
apples, but that all operating in a similar context may be seduced to deception (Bazerman and 
Banaji,  2004).  Instead of businessmen and politicians being  categorically dishonest,  the 
reason that trustfulness is not likely to be a virtue in politics and business is that both groups 
operate in a context in which the chances to fall into the trap of lying are higher than 
anywhere else. The relatively boundless freedom that politicians and businessmen have to 
develop their vision brings certain risks. If, under given circumstance, they are not careful, 
chances are that they lose touch with reality. 
  Second, although existing business literature on lying has already paid much attention 
to the importance of successful image-making and the role of impression management as well 
as, to a lesser extent, the risks of using business plans and the dangers of self-deception, there 
has been no attention to the more philosophical explanations that Arendt provides for lying in 
politics, namely that business is about action and that action requires the ability to deny the 
present reality and the vulnerability of contingent facts.  
  A third contribution of this paper is that Arendt’s analysis of lying in politics deepens 
our insight into the interconnectedness of the various explanations of lying,  as the  five 
elements identified above are likely to enforce each other. In particular, since business is 
about changing the world, it requires a strong capacity to imagine future opportunities that 
are hidden to others. Furthermore, in order to gain the necessary support and financial means 
for their future ventures, it is inherent that managers must create an image that makes others 
trust their abilities to realize this future. This also necessitates that the businessman shows no   
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doubt and remains convinced of his or her dream, even if confronted with opposing facts and 
this may feed the inclination to self-deception. Because the support for the company’s plans 
depends on its future potential, business communication is also  necessarily more about 
opinions than about facts. But to present a coherent picture of future and to master the 
complex processes that make this future happen, the businessman also heavily depends on 
business plans that necessarily bypass other alternative opportunities and therefore help to 
stick at the dreams, even if these become less probable. 
   Our  analysis  therefore  implies that  lying and deception in business will  be very 
persistent, as freedom to act, good image, communication of opinions, planning and self-
deception are inherent to business and the ingrained mechanisms that lead to lying are hard to 
correct. Whatever the ethical views on lying and deception are, moral outrage will not make 
them go away. Moreover, because of the mental nature of lying, legal force can hardly get to 
grips with the phenomenon of lying and deception. Laws have been, and will continue to be, 
an ineffective means to increase the level of veracity of dealings of businessmen. That means 
that it will always be tempting for businessmen to make their way to successful business by 
lying and deception.  
  This does not mean that lying and the escalation of deception in an organization is  
inevitable. There are several moderators that can halt the deception from escalating in an 
organization. The first step to containing lying is to recognize this pervasiveness, for to deny 
the inherent tendencies to lying is to practice self-deception. We must be aware of the 
conditions that easily provide a stimulus to lying and be critical of our judgments and our 
motives driving our actions (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 2004). By confronting the tendency 
toward lying, we will be more likely to reduce its prevalence and prevent its escalation.  
  Furthermore, lying may not lead to further acts of deception if the organizational 
infrastructure makes detection probable or raises enough suspicion to deter further lying 
(Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2008). This depends on the alertness and receptivity of 
monitoring parties, the quality of the organization’s control systems, ethical codes, but also 
on the presence of procedures that protect whistleblowers.  
  If all of these moderators fail to halt the escalation of deception, the increasing 
severity  and pervasiveness of deception can transform it into an organization level 
phenomenon, at which point the only way to end it is organizational failure, as in the case of 
Madoff and Landis. As Fleming and Zyglidopoulos (2008) argue, when the organization has 
passed the tipping point in which more of the organization is deceptive than not, the further 
escalation of deception can kill what once were promising business organizations. As Arendt 
discusses, the contingent character of facts allows boundless possibilities for lying, but in the 
end this makes for self-defeat. If you have to remember one particular falsehood, then that 
may be possible with unwavering consistency. But if you have to adjust images and stories to 
ever-changing circumstances, chances are that you might get lost and confused. In the long 
run, manipulation of facts can therefore only be successful through radical destruction of the 
context. In Western society this is impossible, because of the role of the media providing 
access to material that politicians or businessmen eagerly try to hide. This means that in the   
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end the lies will always be discovered. Therefore, preventing or halting deception once it has 
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1 The Independent, Wednesday 31 December 2008 
2 Similar conditions are mentioned by Velasquez (1998) who distinguishes three conditions for deception: (1) 
the author must intend to have the audience believe something false; (2) the author must know it is false; (3) the 
author must knowingly do something that will lead the audience to believe the falsehood. These elements are 
also present in the definition of financial statement fraud by Rezaee (2005: 279): the deliberate attempt by 
corporations to deceive or mislead users of published financial statements, especially investors and creditors, by 
preparing and disseminating materially misstated financial statements. 
3 For structural reasons, it will always be impossible to prove, in the strict sense, that someone has lied even if 
one can prove that he or she did not tell the truth. One will never be able to prove anything against the person 
who says, ‘What I said is not true; I was wrong, to be sure, but I did not mean to deceive; I am in good faith’ 
(Derrida,2002: 34). 
4 The element of trust is also central in the so-called broken trust theory of corporate fraud, see Choo and Tan, 
2007). A tenet in this theory is that when executives commit fraud, they intentionally break the trust and betray 
shareholders. 
5 A biological counterpart of what can be called ‘unconscious’ behavior can be found in many living species. 
Adaptation to the conditions of life, which Darwin’s colleague Herbert Spencer considered basic to all ethical 
progress, can and does involve deception. That is a major theme of evolutionary studies today. Certain species 
flourishing now might be extinct if they had depended on truthfulness to increase and multiply (Campbell, 2001: 
18). 
6 Biological roots can also be found for image making. To flourish, living things must be able to make good use 
of the resources around them, and these resources include other organisms. If a creature cannot get what it wants 
from others by exercising force, it must do so by using guile. Some animals apply the so-called puppet master 
strategy of tinkering directly with another creature’s brain (Smith, 2004: 30).   
7 Typically, deception in advertising is achieved by omission rather than commission and by making statements 
that, though true when taken strictly literally, carry implications that are false (Barnes, 1994: 44).   
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8 This is different from rational of scientific truth that is based on the laws of science and that can therefore be 
reproduced. 
9 One of the approaches to overcome the problem of inflexibility to unexpected changes in the environment is 
so-called contingency based business planning (Honig, 2004). This method provides tools that assist in the 
navigation and development of paths characterized by uncertainty and unpredictability.  
10 According to Arendt, oddly enough, the President of the United States, allegedly the most powerful man of 
the most powerful country, is likely to be an ideal victim of complete manipulation: because of the immensity of 
his job he is surrounded with advisors who filter the information that reaches him. 
11  Obtained from published annual accounts years 1997 to 2000. 2001 from Landis’ internally prepared 
statements 
12 Seventeenth report pursuant to section 73A of the bankruptcy act concerning the liquidation of Landis Group 
N.V.  
13 Ibid. 
14 It concerns a transcript from a discussion between an official committee of inquirers and Mrs. Jalili. Mrs. 
Jalili worked for Landis as an administrative clerk at the group administration department. She was interviewed 
as part of an official enquiry requested by the courts of Amsterdam. The inquiry was lead by mr. L.P. van den 
Blink and Prof. Dr. L. Traas and published on 5 may 2009, p. 171-172.    
15 The COSO Report (Beasley et al, 1999) reveals that in the majority of financial fraud cases, the CEO and/or 
were associated with the financial fraud.  
16 Freely translated from ‘Stürmische Zeiten Meistern’ by Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2003 